Designing Sustainable Launch Systems: Flexibility, Lock-In and System Evolution by Silver, Matthew & De Weck, Olivier







Designing Sustainable Launch Systems 
Flexibility, Lock-In and System Evolution 
 
 
Matthew Silver1, Dr. Olivier de Weck2 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Cambridge, MA, 02139 
 
NASA has recently made the decision to develop a heavy lift launch system with Shuttle-
Derived components, but myriad questions remain about technical design and 
development strategy. The complexity of heavy lift launch systems and their 
interconnectedness to the rest of the exploration architecture ensures that near-term 
architectural design decisions will greatly affect long-term options for future space 
exploration. This paper uses Real Options valuation to compare two possible 
development plans for a heavy lift launch system. Taking into account cost profiles, 
capacity, and uncertainty in demand, various heavy lift vehicle strategies are presented 
and evaluated along plausible development paths. These strategies can be framed as 
Shuttle-Derived-Architectures with "options" to change capability in the face shifting 
demand and risk tolerance scenarios. Initial results suggest that life-cycle optimality is 
heavily dependant on schedule uncertainty, while less sensitive to lunar and mars mission 
architectures and initial mass in low earth orbit (IMLEO). Future work will involve more 
detailed analysis of switching options and switching costs, as well as a more 
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1.0 Introduction 
A principle determinant of comparative sustainability from an economic perspective involves the pattern 
of spending associated with development and operations, under various demand scenarios. For example, 
in the early 1980’s cost models demonstrated that the Space Shuttle was more affordable than expendable 
systems only at inordinately high levels of demand. While political pressures may have induced various 
groups to advocate for their demand-scenario of choice, the reality, as always, proved unpredictable. All 
scenarios are best-guesses, lying along a probability distribution which is itself difficult to ascertain. 
 
Real Options Analysis provides a method to design systems that capitalize on, rather than suffer from 
these inevitable fluctuations in the operating environment. It provides a framework to quantify how 
system attributes that often decrease optimality in a fixed operating scenario may enhance flexibility and 
thus “life-cycle optimality” over time. The goal of the analysis is to quantify the benefits of designing 
systems that are more flexible and reactive in the face of uncertainty—and thus more sustainable for long-
term endeavors like space exploration.3 
 
This section describes a model of the forthcoming decision on Heavy Lift Launch that uses using “real-
options thinking.” The model presented here compares Shuttle-Derived Vehicles (SDV) to EELV-derived 
architectures (EELVD), under various demand scenarios, in order to answer the following critical 
question: Which is more cost effective from a life-cycle perspective: SDV or EELVD with an option to 
expand? 
 
This question can be framed as an option on EELV vehicles. Shuttled derived vehicles provide 80+ 
metric-ton (mt) capability to LEO.1 However, because preliminary results indicate that a vehicle 
considerably lower than the 80mt may be adequate for lunar missions, it is conceivable to design a 
smaller system based on EELV-derived components with the option to expand for future Mars missions. 
These options could take multiple forms, including launch-pad modifications or allowances for additional 
stages or booster-rockets. While SDV systems have the advantage of having much hardware already built, 
EELV systems could have the advantage of being smaller, cheaper to maintain, and more agile in the face 
of change. 
 
2.0 Real Options Thinking in a Nutshell 
A major goal of Real Options Analysis is the development of a clear, understandable measure of 
flexibility.2 Real options valuation is based directly on the valuation of financial options. While it is not 
the purpose of this report to examine the details of Real Options Theory, the following information will 
be useful for understanding the model and analysis below. 
 
An option, whether financial or real, is formally defined as “a right, but not an obligation, to take action 
now or in the future at a pre-determined price.” [2] In finance this takes the form of a contractual 
agreement to buy or sell a stock at a pre-determined price (called the strike-price). The right to buy a 
stock is called a call option. The right to sell is called a put option.  
                                                     
3 For a good primer on Real Options, see: de Neufville, Richard. “Architecting Systems Using Real Options.” ESD 
Working Paper, May 2002. http://web.mit.edu/spacearchitects/Archive/Real%20Options%20Working%20Paper.pdf 
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Financial options also come in two varieties depending on when they can be exercised. European Options 
must be exercised on a pre-determined date. American Options can be exercised anytime before their 
expiration date. The majority of traded financial options, like real options, are American. 
 
Similarly, a Real Option is as an element in the system (or on the system), which allows managers to take 
an action now or in the future at a pre-determined price. For example, designing EELVs so that they can 
accommodate varying numbers of booster rockets creates “the right, but not the obligation” to enhance 
lifting capability if the market demands. Booster rockets, and the design modifications to the main rocket 
needed to support them, can be defined as an American Option in the ELLV system.  
 
Real options can be either in a system, or on a system. An option in a system is a technical construction 
that provides the ability to change or add something to the system. As noted, booster rockets are options 
in the EELV system. An option on a system entails the right to develop that entire system or program at a 
given time. For example, certain purchases might need to be made in order to keep the option to develop a 
Shuttle-Derived vehicle in the future. The actions taken to keep this possibility open can be framed as an 
option on the Shuttle Derived Program.  
 
As all system designers know, options that make a system more flexible come at cost and degradations in 
system-performance. Real options analysis allows the classic question “how much is this flexibility 
worth?” to be reframed as: “How much is the Real Option worth?” 
 
There are multiple methods, all more or less complicated, to modeling the value of real options. Suffice to 
note here that the value of an option stems from three basic features: 1.  asymmetric risk 2. Uncertainty in 
demand 3. The value of information and the discretion of managers. Options have asymmetric because 
once purchased, they have an upside but practically no downside (other than potential loses in 
performance which remain fixed). Because the future is uncertain and new information arrives constantly, 
options give managers the discretion to alter system attributes more flexibly, so they can take advantage 
of this upside when needed. Valuing real options thus demands an understanding of the level of 
uncertainty in demand, and the financial and performance costs associate with the system. 
 
In its simplest instantiation (and quite often, the most appropriate given error-levels in the data and the 
need for practicality), a decision tree approach can be used. This approach combines the probability that 
different paths might be taken with the economic concept of “expected cost,” in order to compare the cost 
of different systems in different scenarios. This will be used for our model, and described in more depth 
below. 
3.0 Elements of Life-Cycle Cost 
The value of Real Options is dependant on both the level of uncertainty surrounding critical demand 
variables (the probability distribution of future demand), and the cost-profile of the systems being 
deployed. The life-cycle cost of a launch system, as with many other kinds of systems, can be partitioned 
into three main categories: Development Cost, Fixed Recurring Cost, and Variable Recurring Cost. Figure 
1 illustrates the relationship between these costs. 




Figure 1: Elements of Launch Vehicle Life Cycle Cost. 
 
Development Cost includes Design, Construction, Testing, and Evaluation of the launch system before it 
is deployed. It includes all elements of the program prior to operations. 
 
Fixed Recurring Cost includes the cost of maintaining the launch system, regardless of whether there are 
any launches in a given year. It includes basic program costs such as personnel, management, and 
facilities maintenance. For expendable vehicles, it can include the cost of producing one vehicle, in order 
to keep production lines open. 
 
Variable Recurring Cost is the extra cost associated with meeting different levels of demand. It will 
include, among other elements, the number of vehicles produced, transportation, assembly and payload 
integration, flight operations, and vehicle recovery (if necessary).  
 
It should be noted that variable recurring cost in our model is not the “cost-per flight” as this value is 
commonly understood. Cost per flight is traditionally arrived at by adding the variable and fixed recurring 
costs, and dividing by the number of flights in a given year. The result is that cost-per-flight drops with 
increasing flight rate due both to a lower ratio of fixed-recurring-cost per flight, and economies of scale in 
production. For reusable vehicles such as the Space Shuttle, cost-per-flight drops sharply with increased 
flight-rate because reuse implies that variable recurring cost is lower than for expendable vehicles. 
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below. 
 
Much can be understood about the sustainability of different programs simply understanding the relative 
size of these cost-segments. More specifically, the ratio of fixed-recurring to variable recurring cost has a 
large impact on long-term program costs. A program with low fixed recurring costs will be able to 
“weather” periods of low demand, without draining the Agency’s budget. Quite often, of course, this low 
fixed cost comes at the expense of higher variable recurring cost. If relatively high demand is guaranteed, 
the goal of maintaining a low fixed-recurring cost may be less important than keeping variable costs low. 
 
Maintaining a low fixed recurring cost also has advantages in other ways. Most fixed-recurring costs go 
toward maintaining the workforce associated with the program, including basic facilities. A larger 
workforce creates strong political incentives and organizational inertia, which makes change the course of 
the program more difficult. Keeping the vehicle workforce as small as possible (and by extension, 
minimizing fixed recurring cost) thus both increase the flexibility of program costs in the face of change, 
and the flexibility of program direction, as the exploration vision evolves. This general discussion is of 
course directly transferable to the comparison of Shuttle-Derived and EELV derived systems, and will be 
elaborated upon in the discussion of model results. 
4.0 Modeling Uncertainty in Demand 
The Heavy Lift Vehicle must meet the ETO needs NASA’s exploration vision, while keeping costs as low 
as possible. Uncertainty in demand is thus a critical factor. This has two main elements: Schedule 
uncertainty and architectural uncertainty. 
 
Schedule Uncertainty refers to the pattern of missions through time. When will the first lunar mission be 
launch, and how many will be launched thereafter? When will the first Mars mission be launch and how 
many thereafter? Depending on the level of fixed recurring costs, schedule uncertainty can greatly affect 
the life-cycle cost of a vehicle. Ideally, of course, an appropriate vehicle will be developed at a minimum 
time before it is needed. We can incorporate schedule uncertainty into the model by assuming 3 different 
schedule scenarios: low, medium, and high. 
 
Architecture Uncertainty has to do with level of IMLEO per mission. Different Lunar and Mars 
architectures have been proposed, each with different IMLEO. This uncertainty can be modeled 
probabilistically.  
 
Combining these two sources of uncertainty, we can create a notional decision-tree of the different factors 
that will affect the relative merits of each plan. The tree in Figure 2 is not exhaustive, but gives an idea of 
the different occurrences that could greatly affect future decisions. Moon 1, 2, 3 and Mars, 1, 2, 3 refer to 
three possible lunar and Mars architectures. 




The decision tree has both chance nodes and decision nodes. Chance nodes encompass factors that are 
beyond the control of system designers. Decision nodes are issues controlled by system designers. As 
illustrated, it is assumed that the heavy lift decision will be made before critical factors such as the level 
of demand and the exact lunar and Martian architectures have been established. This may not be the case. 
If the decision can be postponed, the optimal vehicle for lunar mission could be created, for example. 
Further, other factors such as the development of nuclear thermal rockets, may greatly affect these later 
decision points. 
 
Of course, this tree is somewhat idealized. In reality, the various chance points may come before or after 
the decision points. The important fact is that all of this branch points are currently uncertain, and the 
relative advantages of different heavy-lift vehicles will change with them. 
 
Also, exact probabilities are difficult to estimate. Our analysis overcomes this problem by examining 
sensitivities to changes in probabilities. Later analyses should consider using a probability density 
function for each decision and chance point. 
 
A cost model can now estimate the total life-cycle costs for each plan along each path of the decision tree. 
By assigning probabilities to the various scenarios, with all of the scenarios totaling to a probability of 
one, we can estimate the expected cost along that path. 
5.0 SDV vs EELV-Derived Architectures: Two Development Plans 
Using these distinctions, we can create a discounted cash-flow model to evaluate the cost of different 
architectures under different demand scenarios. We can do this by creating two different development 
plans—one using EELV-derived vehicles and the other using SDVs—and comparing their total costs 
under different demand scenarios. These costs can be coupled to a decision tree representation of the 
Heavy-Lift decision, and assigned probabilities to calculate expected life-cycle cost. 
 
The first step, then, is to limit the Heavy Lift architectural options for each development plan. Recent 
NASA studies suggest that a side-mount Shuttle-Derived system, with 4 or 5-segment SRBs is preferable 
to other configurations along multiple criteria [1]. The same NASA study also estimated costs for various 
elements of that program. Thus, let us define Plan A as follows: Develop a 4 or 5-segment side-mount 
Figure 2: Notional Decision Tree View of Launch System Life-Cycle 
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shuttle derived system, beginning in 2010.  
 
While the shuttle derived vehicles have lifting capacity of 82 and 95 metric tons to LEO, respectively, 
recent studies suggest that 40-60 metric vehicles should be adequate for lunar missions. This suggests that 
EELV-derived systems could be designed at this lower range, with the option to expand to greater values 
for mars missions. Thus, let us define Plan B as follows: Develop a 34 or 51 metric ton vehicle for lunar 
missions in 2010 and then develop a larger 100 metric vehicle for Mars-class missions. Figure 3 illustrates 
plan A and Plan B, using vehicles from the SDV study mentioned above and a recent ETO study 
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Figure 3: Two Plans for Heavy Lift Launch; SDV vs EELVD 
As noted, the second plan constitutes an option to expand. In a traditional Real Options Analysis this plan 
could be compared to the same plan without the option to expand, thus determining the value of the 
options. Practically, however, the decision at NASA will involve developing plan A or B. 
 
It is clear that both plans present different advantages. The SDV plans eliminate the need to develop two 
systems and make use of a lot of existing hardware. The EELV plans reduce fixed-recurring cost initially, 
by creating a smaller vehicle. They also give managers the discretion to begin building a larger system 
only when Mars travel is more certain, thus potentially freeing up more money for lunar travel now. The 
question remains how to estimate the three cost-elements described above for these systems, as a function 
of demand. 
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6.0 Shuttle-Derived Costs 
As noted, the vehicle options for Plan A were taken from the “Exploration Transportation Team Task 5: 
Shuttle Derived Vehicles.” Development costs and cost-per flight were estimated in this study for various 
SDV options. Cost numbers for our model were taken from this study as follows: 
 
Development Cost: Taken from SDV study 
 
Table 1: SDV Development Costs 
 Total Dev Cost ($mil) 
SDV 4Seg $4,158 
SDV 5Seg $5,643 
 
Variable Recurring: The SDV study had cost numbers for flight-rates of 1 through 4 per year for each 
SDV option. These followed a consistent pattern and were extrapolated for flight rates greater than 4. 
 
Table 2: SDV 4-Segment Variable Recurring Costs 
SDV 4 Segment Flights/yr 1 2 3 4 
Program $31 $47 $62 $76 
Vehicle $767 $1,275 $1,757 $2,226 
Launch $79 $81 $83 $85 
Flight $16 $16 $16 $17 
Reserves $111 $168 $220 $269 
Total Cost $1,004 $1,588 $2,138 $2,673 
 
Table 3: SDV 5-Segment Variable Recurring Costs 
SDV 5 Segment Flights/yr 1 2 3 4 
Program $32 $49 $64 $79 
Vehicle $786 $1,312 $1,813 $2,300 
Launch $93 $95 $97 $99 
Flight $16 $16 $16 $17 
Reserves $151 $248 $339 $428 
Total Cost $1,077 $1,720 $2,330 $2,923 
 
Fixed Recurring: As noted, this is simply the cost of maintaining the launch-system if there are no-flights 
in that year. Theoretically it is the program cost (personnel, facilities, etc.) + the cost of producing one 
Page 9 of 15 Pages 
vehicle, ignoring the cost of launch and operations. Therefore, this cost includes the following from the 
tables above: 1 vehicle per year (to keep production lines open) + Program costs (personnel, etc). Launch, 
ops, and reserve cost not included. 
 
Pre-Development Ramp-Up: In order to keep the possibility of developing a shuttle derived vehicle, 
certain long-lead-time purchases will need to be made very soon. It is not clear the exact costs of these 
purchases. We have therefore estimated a “ramp-up” of increasing funds through 2009, when 
development begins, and run the analysis with and without this ramp-up. The ramp-up is as follows:  
 
Table 4: SDV “Ramp-Up” 







It should be noted that it was unclear how much this ramp-up would be, and how much of it should be 
billed to the SDV program, rather than the Shuttle Program. This question is beyond the control of the 
current analyses so, as stated, results were run with and without ramp-up.  
7.0 EELV-Derived Costs 
Vehicle options for Plan B were taken from a recent NASA study called: Vehicle options taken from: 
“ETO Trade Study for Future Moon-Mars Exploration,” Presented at NASA HQ, June 16, 2004. This 
study including development and recurring cost. However, because we want recurring cost as a function 
of demand, another value was needed. 
 
We have already discussed in chapter 5 how the cost-per flight for large EELVs can be extrapolated from 
past cost. As with other capacity problems, economies of scale suggest that the relationship of size to 
average launch cost will follow a power law. We therefore have the following estimates for our cost 
elements: 
 
Development Cost: Taken from ETO study, spread over 5 years and phased in same proportion as shuttle 
development cost: 
 
Table 5: Development Cost Spread 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 
~ % Total Dev. Cost 7.5% 25% 35% 25% 7.5% 
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Table 6: EELVD Development Costs 
  Dev. Cost ($mil) 
34mt Delta IV Core and Zenit $4,600 
51mt Delta V Core 4 Atlas 5 $4,600 
99mt TCA5 $8,500 
 
Variable Recurring: Cost Per flight * Number of flights. Cost per flight is a function of capacity based on 
power law relationship using data from “International Guide to Launch Vehicles,” by Isokawitz.3 Only 
U.S. launchers included. No leaning curves assumed for increased production rates. 
 
66.0226.0 CLaunchCost ×=   ($million) 
Where C = Capacity in Kilograms 
 
Fixed Recurring: The cost is modeled here as 89% of the cost of a single launch, based on a similar 
relationship between variable-recurring and fixed-recurring cost for Shuttle Derived Vehicles. (See next 
section) 
8.0 The Discount Rate 
The present value of a plan depends both on the amount of money spent, and when that money is spent. 
Discounting non-inflated costs takes into account the opportunity cost of investing sooner rather than 
later. If a plan enables us to push costs backward in time, for example, this has real value because we can 
use the money freed up now to move other priorities along (i.e. development of nuclear propulsion, etc). 
 
More formally, we must note that the discount rate has two factors: interest and inflation. Interest 
represents the opportunity cost of investing now. If future costs are nominal--that is, in inflated dollars--
they need to be reduced by both inflation and interest to get a one-to-one relationship with today's dollars. 
This is done using a "nominal discount rate." If future costs are "real" (that is, in constant-year dollars--as 
in our model), we only need to account for interest. This means we use the "real discount rate," which is 
the nominal rate minus inflation. These issues are explained in the OMB circular that sets forth the rates 
for government-project NPV analysis: http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a094/a94_appx-c.html 
 
 
There may be some debate as to how much "opportunity cost" should be counted in a NASA NPV 
analysis. Many studies appear to discount by inflation, or a "real" discount rate of 0. This means that 
future costs in constant-year dollars would not be discounted. This does not, however, provide for sound 
decision-making. Discounting at inflation ignores the benefits derived from having more discretion over 
future spending, including the very real benefit of being able to invest money now on other projects (such 
as nuclear thermal rockets). Thus, for the purpose of the heavy lift decision, it is most appropriate to use a 
"real discount rate" provided by the OMB circular. However, as this represents opportunity cost of 
investing it is difficult to estimate exactly and should be varied to determine sensitivity to discount. 
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9.0 Summary of the Model 
Method of Analysis: Discounted cash flow models were created for four distinct development plans and 
computed under various demand scenarios. Major cost elements are: Development, Fixed-Recurring, 
Variable Recurring. The life-cycle costs for these pans were computed under three distinct demand 
scenarios: low, medium, and high. 
 
Probabilities were assigned to the three plans, and expected life-cycle costs calculated. Pair-wise 
sensitivity analyses were run, as the probabilities between low-medium and medium-high varied between 
zero and one. The figure below illustrates the decision tree view of one of the medium to high pair-wise 
analysis. 
 
Figure 4: Decision Tree view of Expected-Cost Calculation 
 
The Plans: Two basic vehicle architectures were evaluated, each with two iterations. All plans assume 
development begins in 2010. The plans are: 
 
• Plan A.1: 4 Segment Side-Mount Shuttle-Derived launcher developed in 2010 
• Plan A.2: 5 Segment Side-Mount Shuttle Derived Launch developed in 2010 
 
• Plan B.1: 51 mt EELV-Derived launcher in 2010; Upgraded to 100mt for Mars Missions. 
• Plan B.2: 34 mt EELVD launch begun in 2010; Upgraded to 100mt for Mars Missions.  
 
Demand Scenarios: Launch Demand Scenarios were taken from the current MIT CE&R study estimates. 
They include low, medium, and high launch demand scenarios for a baseline Moon and to Mars 
architecture, each resulting in a set of IMLEOs each year until 2030. As noted, the architecture itself 
should also be varied probabilistically. This will be conducted in further analyses. Specifically, the 
demand scenarios are as follows. Year is at the top and the IMLEO is at the bottom. 
Table 7: High Demand Scenario 
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 













    CTS CTS     Crew CTS Crew   Crew CTS Crew   Crew 
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127 100 344 227 403 127 673 227 673 127 673 227 673 127 673 
 
Table 8: Medium Demand Scenario 
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 
CTS Cargo Habitat Cargo 
Mars 
PD   
Mars 
PD   
Mars 
PD   
Mars 
PD   
Mars 
PD   
Mars 
PD 
    CTS CTS     Crew   Crew   Crew   Crew   Crew 
127 100 344 227 403   673   673   673   673   673 
 
Table 9: Low Demand Scenario 
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 
  CTS   Cargo Habitat   Cargo   
Mars 
PD   
Mars 
PD   
Mars 
PD   
Mars 
PD 
        CTS   CTS       Crew   Crew   Crew 
  127   100 344   227   403   673   673   673 
 
10.0  Results 
Life cycle costs were calculated with and without the ramp-up costs for the Shuttle Derived program. 
Figure 5 illustrates total discounted life-cycle costs for the four plans, with shuttle ramp-up costs 
included. Two facts are most striking: First, both Shuttle Derived plans are more expensive than EELV-
derived plans across all scenarios. Second, the relative benefit of EELV derived vehicles increases as 
demand increases. Factors affecting this comparison are addressed below. 























Figure 5: Discounted Life-Cycle Cost Comparison, With Shuttle Ramp-Up Costs.  3.5% Discount Rate. 
Figure 6 presents discounted life-cycle cost of the four plans without shuttle ramp-up costs. Here, the 
Shuttle-Derived plan with 5-segment SRBs is better than all other plans at low demand. At higher 
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demand, EELV-derived vehicles again beat SDVs. It is important to note that the lack of ramp-up costs 
removes approximately $3 billion dollars in development-related costs. The exact cost of the ramp-up 
must be known with more precision if a sound decision is to be made. 























Figure 6: Discounted Life-Cycle Cost Comparison, Without Shuttle Ramp-Up Costs. 3.5% Discount Rate. 
 
Probabilistic Analysis: The only cross-over point in this analysis thus exists between low and medium or 
low and high demand, with shuttle ramp-up costs not included. A decision-tree approach can be used to 
calculate expected life-cycle costs as a function of the probability that one of these demand scenarios will 
occur. To do this we need a probability density function (PDF).  We can estimate the PDF as uniform, 
although in reality it will probably be skewed. Future analyses will include a different non-uniform PDFs. 
It must be noted, however, that a uniform PDF creates a linear relationship between probability of 
demand scenario and cost. The result is a linear extrapolation from high to low-demand life-cycle costs. 
 
Figure 7 illustrates the expected life-cycle cost of a the four plans, as a function of the probability that a 
low versus high demand scenario will occur. It demonstrates that when there is approximately 15% 
chance of high demand or greater, EELV-derived plans are superior to the Shuttle-Derived Plan A.2.  
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Figure 7: Model Results without ramp-up; 3.5% discount rate; Low to High Demand. 
 
11.0 Conclusion 
According to our assumptions, if the ramp-up is included, the Shuttle-Derived programs are clearly more 
expensive over their life-cycle than EELV-derived systems. If an SDV ramp-up is not included, SDV 
vehicles are more cost-effective the EELVD under lower-demand scenarios, however, EELVD are still 
less costly that SDV at medium and high demand levels. The cross-over point here is approximately 85% 
chance or greater that a low demand scenario will occur. 
 
Various factors influence these outcomes. Smaller launchers benefit over a wider range of scenarios 
because fixed recurring costs are lower, so total costs follow demand more exactly than for shuttle-
derived vehicles.  SDV plans benefit because they require only one development effort, while EELVD 
plans required a development effort prior to both lunar and mars missions. However, the single 
development effort of the SDV comes at the expense of higher fixed recurring and variable recurring 
costs. An SDV vehicle is likely larger than needed for lunar missions, and this means that a larger vehicle 
is built and maintained sooner. Also, it is relatively safe to say that an 80+mt SDV would be built purely 
for NASA missions, while an EELVD may be created around a core of vehicles and expertise which 
transfers to the commercial and military domain. This may relax the fixed recurring costs (in the form of 
personnel and facilities) for NASA when demand is low.  
 
Sensitivity The immediate question arises as to how sensitive the results are to changes in assumptions. 
Sensitivity analysis has been conduct on a first version of this model. These analyses suggest that final 
results are less sensitive to changes in architecture (that is, changes in IMLEO for each mission) and 
changes in discount rate, than they are to changes in the schedule of demand.4 Sensitivity to changes in 
demand, however, increases with discount rate. Therefore, it may be prudent to establish which discount 
rate will be used when making the decision. Sensitivity to IMLEO using updated lunar and mars 
























Plan A.1 (4 Segment SRB)
Plan A.2 (5 Segment SRB)
Plan B.1 (51 to 99mt)
Plan B.2 (34 to 99mt)
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architectures is currently being included in a third version of the model. 
 
Options on EELV: It must be noted that, although all cost number are uncertain, a critical category of 
EELV costs were likely over-estimated. Plan B.1 or B.2 were designed as initial systems with options to 
expand, however, the development cost of the expansion was modeled as an independent development 
effort. Options to expand that would be built into EELV-derived systems, however, would lower the cost 
of this second effort. These might include modifying launch facilities to accommodate a Mars-Class 
launch when pad mods for the smaller launch were conducted. Also, designing a launcher with the ability 
to accommodate an additional stage or large additional boosters may. These possibilities should be 
examined in more detail. 
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